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CHICAGO MATH AND SCIENCE ACADEMY: ARE CHARTER
SCHOOLS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE UNDER THE NLRA, AND
DOES IT MATTER?
By Stanley B. Eisenhammer and Christopher M. Hoffmann
Stanley Eisenhammer is a partner with Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn, LLP and has
been practicing law in Illinois since 1973. Much of his practice focuses on public labor relations, and he
regularly practices before the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board. He is a former board member
and president of the Board of Education of Northwest Township High School District 214, and he has
served as a trustee on the Board of Trustees of the Village of Arlington Heights. Mr. Eisenhammer is
also a member of the Advisory Committee to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.
Chris Hoffmann is an associate at Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn, LLP. He earned his
J.D. from IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law in 2011, where he was a member of the IIT Chicago-Kent Law
Review and the Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal. Mr. Hoffmann currently practices in
all areas of school and municipal law.

I. INTRODUCTION
Charter schools are at the forefront of educational reform. Freed of burdensome
state regulation and onerous administrative requirements, charter schools are
intended to offer parents and their children innovative methods of teaching and
learning that have yet to be replicated in traditional public schools. As a result,
charter schools have rapidly expanded across the country, experiencing enormous
growth and ever increasing enrollment,[1] since the nation’s first charter school
law was passed in 1991 in Minnesota.[2] Charter schools will also have an
increasing impact on labor relations in the public sector as more teachers, who
would be employed in often heavily unionized traditional public schools, now find
themselves employed at charter schools that either are exempt from state collective
bargaining laws or do not have a history of unionization.
Will charter schools’ unique status as laboratories for educational change and
innovation have the effect of eroding employee participation in unions?[3] If so,
will state legislatures respond by changing their labor relations laws and/or charter
school laws so that charter schools are treated the same as traditional public
schools under their labor relations laws?[4] Or will the recent backlash against
public employees and their unions[5] cause state legislatures to avoid the issue?
The answers to these questions depend upon whether state legislatures view the
right to collectively bargain as an impediment to educational innovation and
change or a fundamental protection for public employees that can coexist with the
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educational reform movement. However, the power to decide this important policy
question can be taken out of the hands of state legislators if labor relations at
charter schools are found to be governed by the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently found that Illinois charter
schools fall with the jurisdiction of the NLRA. Although the opinion is specifically
limited to Illinois charter schools and the NLRB declined to establish any “brightline test,” it appears likely that most, if not all, charter schools, by their very nature,
will fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA regardless of whether they are made
subject to a state’s collective bargaining laws.
Because this case arose in a state where charter schools were not exempted from
Illinois’ collective bargaining laws, the parties to the case, including
the amici National Education Association, the American Federation of Teachers
and the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools took positions based on the
perceived advantage of being governed by the Illinois’s Educational Labor
Relations Act (“IELRA)” versus the NLRA. Thus, the amici, in effect, argued in
favor of positions that would be favorable to them in Illinois but against their
interests in any state that exempted charter schools from the state’s public sector
collective bargaining laws or that did not have public sector labor laws. For
example, the losing amici unions argued that charter schools in Illinois should be
exempt from the NLRA ignoring the adverse impact such position would have on
unionization in states that either do not make charter schools subject to public
sector bargaining laws or do not have public sector labor laws.[6] In essence,
unlike Andrew Jackson who won the Battle of New Orleans without realizing that
the War of 1812 was over, the unions lost the battle without realizing that they
actually won the war.[7]
II. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?: THE NAGGING QUESTION ABOUT
CHARTER SCHOOLS
A.

The Hawkins County Test

What is a charter school? More specifically, is a charter school a “political
subdivision” of the state under the Section 2(2) of the NLRA?[8] That was the
question before the NLRB after Chicago Math and Science Academy, a charter
school in Chicago, filed an election petition with the NLRB in a roundabout effort
to defeat a representation petition filed by the Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers
& Staff, IFT, AFT, AFL–CIO with the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board
(“IELRB”).[9] If charter schools are political subdivisions, then they are excluded
from the NLRA because they do not meet the definition of “employer.”[10] The
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NLRAexcludes from its coverage “the United States or any wholly owned
Government Corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof.”[11] However, if charter schools are not political subdivisions,
then they are private employers subject to the NLRA.
In Chicago Math and Science Academy, the NLRB applied the test for determining
whether an entity is a political subdivision set out by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County.[12] Under
the HawkinsCounty test, an entity meets the definition of “political subdivision” if
it is either (1) created directly by the state so as to constitute a department or
administrative arm of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.[13]
Hawkins County involved a natural gas utility district organized under
Tennessee’s Utility District Law of 1937.[14] The pipefitters employed by the utility
district petitioned the NLRB for an order directing the utility district to hold a
representation election.[15] The utility district argued that it was a political
subdivision under the NLRA and, accordingly, was not an employer. Applying the
above test, the NLRB found that the utility district was not a political subdivision
and ordered that a representation election be held among the pipefitters employed
by the utility district.[16]
The pipefitters union won the election and was certified as the pipefitters’
representative by the NLRB. However, the utility district refused to bargain with
the union, which resulted in the pipefitters’ union filing an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB.[17] The NLRB issued a cease and desist order, but the
utility district continued to refuse to bargain with the union.[18] The union then
sought an order from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the Sixth Circuit found
that the utility district was a political subdivision and refused to order the utility
district to bargain with the union.[19] The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
The Court was confronted with two primary issues in Hawkins County. The first
issue was whether the Tennessee Supreme Court’s finding that utility districts
organized under the Utility District Law of 1937 “was an operation for a state
governmental or public purpose” should be given preclusive effect on the issue of
whether the utility district was a political subdivision.[20] The Sixth Circuit held
that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s finding was conclusive and binding on the
NLRB.[21] However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit. The
Supreme Court held that such state declarations may be given “careful
consideration,” but were not controlling.[22] This aspect of the Court’s opinion is
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important given that state labor laws may expressly state that charter schools fall
within their coverage, which is precisely the case in Illinois.[23]
Second, in light of the Court’s holding that state declarations are not to be given
preclusive effect, the Court had to determine whether the natural gas utility district
was a political subdivision under the NLRA. On this issue, the Court applied the
NLRB’s two-pronged test, under which, an entity is a political subdivision if it is
either (1) created directly by the state so as to constitute a department or
administrative arm of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.[24]
The Court focused on the second prong of the test, and found that the utility district
was a political subdivision. The utility district was administered by a Board of
Commissioners appointed by an elected county judge and subject to removal
through proceedings that could be initiated by the governor, the county prosecutor,
or private citizens. The Court stated, “[p]lainly, commissioners who are beholden
to an elected public official for their appointment, and are subject to removal
procedures applicable to all public officials, qualify as ‘individuals who are
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate’ within the Board’s
test.”[25]
Additionally, the Court described numerous other factors that indicated the utility
district was a political subdivision. The Court noted that the utility district was
granted the power of eminent domain, its records were public records subject to
inspection, the commission was granted subpoena power, the district’s bonds were
given tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, and social security
benefits were provided to the district’s employees through voluntary coverage
rather than mandatory coverage because the district was considered a political
subdivision under the Social Security Act.[26]
B.

The Chicago Math and Science Academy Decision

In Chicago Math and Science Academy, the NLRB addressed the question of
whether charter schools are “political subdivisions” under the NLRA for the first
time, although NLRB administrative law judges had ruled on the
question.[27] In In Re C.I. Wilson Academy, Inc., an NLRB administrative law
judge in Arizona ruled that charter schools established under Arizona’s charter
school law are not political subdivisions under the NLRA.[28] Further, the NLRB
itself had ruled that private companies that contract with charter schools to
manage the charter school and employ the staff at the schools are also not political
subdivisions.[29] However, the NLRB had not squarely addressed the question of
whether charter schools fall under the “political subdivision” exemption of the
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NLRA. At the time that the NLRB accepted review of this case, the question of
whether charter schools should be considered political subdivisions under the
NLRA was such an open issue that the NLRB invited the public in January 2011 to
submit amicus briefs on the issue.[30]
The Illinois Charter Schools Law

Under the Illinois Charter Schools Law, Illinois charter schools must be “organized
and operated as a nonprofit corporation or other discrete, legal, nonprofit entity
authorized under the laws of the State of Illinois.”[31] Illinois charter schools must
also be “public, nonsectarian, nonreligious, non-home based, and non-profit
school[s].”[32] Illinois charter schools are subject to the Illinois Freedom of
Information Act and the Illinois Open Meetings Act.[33] Additionally, Illinois
charter schools receive the vast majority of their funding from public sources, with
the majority of those funds coming from property tax dollars designated for the
local school district in which the charter school operates.[34] Currently, the
Charter Schools Law limits the number of charter schools that may operate in the
state to 120, 75 of which may operate in the City of Chicago.[35]
The Illinois Charter Schools Law exempts charter schools from many of the state
laws and regulations that govern the operation of traditional public
schools.[36] Under this broad exemption, an Illinois appellate court held that
charter schools were not subject to the IELRA.[37] However, just prior to the
Appellate Court’s decision, the General Assembly amended the Charter Schools
Law to expressly make charter schools subject to theIELRA.[38] The General
Assembly also amended the IELRA to expressly include “the governing body of a
charter school” within the definition of “employer” under the statute.[39]
An application to establish a charter school must be submitted to the local school
board within the school district where the charter school will operate and “may be
initiated by individuals or organizations that will have majority representation on
the board of directors or other governing body of the corporation or other discrete
legal entity that is to be established to operate the proposed charter
school....”[40] The charter school proposal must be submitted in the form of a
proposed contract between the charter school and the local school
board.[41] Within forty-five days of its receipt of the charter proposal, the local
school board must hold a public meeting to gather information to assist it in its
evaluation of the charter proposal.[42] The local school board must vote on
whether to approve or deny the proposal within thirty days of the public
meeting.[43]
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If the local school board votes to approve the charter proposal, the proposal must
be certified as complying with the Charter Schools Law by the Illinois State Board
of Education.[44] The certified charter constitutes a binding contract between the
charter school and the local school board “under the terms of which the local school
board authorizes the governing body of the charter school to operate the charter
school on the terms specified in the contract.”[45] Charter school applicants whose
proposals are denied may appeal the local school board’s decision to the Illinois
State Charter Commission, which may reverse the local school board decision if it
finds that the proposal complies with the Charter Schools Law and is in the best
interests of the local school district’s students.[46]
A charter may be revoked by the local school board if the local school board clearly
demonstrates that the charter school did any of the following: (1) committed a
material violation of any of the conditions, standards, or procedures set forth in
the charter; (2) failed to meet or make reasonable progress toward achievement of
the content standards or pupil performance standards identified in the charter; (3)
failed to meet generally accepted standards of fiscal management; or (4) violated
any provision of law from which the charter school was not exempted.[47] In such
cases, the charter school is given up to two years to remedy the problem.[48] Only
after the local school board finds that the charter school failed to remedy the
problem or follow the proposed timeline for remediation may the local school
board revoke the charter.[49]
NLRB Holds that Illinois Charter Schools are Not “Political
Subdivisions”

In June of 2010, teachers at Chicago Math and Science Academy filed a recognition
petition with the IELRB after two-thirds of the teaching staff signed authorization
cards designating the Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers as their exclusive
bargaining representative.[50] Under the IELRA, the governing board of charter
schools are included within the definition of “employer” and covered by the
law.[51] The push to unionization at Chicago Math and Science Academy was part
of a larger campaign being waged at charter schools across the city as the Chicago
Teachers Union sought to unionize all of the city’s charter schools.[52]
Chicago Math and Science Academy, however, refused to recognize the union,
arguing that it was a private employer, and thus governed by the NLRA, not the
IELRA.[53] In response to the union’s representation petition filed with the
IELRB, Chicago Math and Science Academy filed a petition with the NLRB on July
29, 2010, contending that it was a private employer covered by the NLRA.[54] The
union, meanwhile, argued that Chicago Math and Science Academy was exempt
from the NLRA as a “political subdivision” of the State of Illinois.[55] The Acting
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Regional Director of Region 13 held that Chicago Math and Science Academy is a
political subdivision of the State of Illinois under both prongs of the Hawkins
County test.[56]
On December 14, 2012, the NLRB handed down its decision holding that Chicago
Math and Science Academy Charter School, Inc. was not a political subdivision of
the State of Illinois. As such, Chicago Math and Science Academy was subject to
the NLRA as a private employer.
Under the first prong of the Hawkins County test, the NLRB determines first
whether the entity “was created directly by the state, such as by a government
entity, a legislative act, or a public official.”[57] If so, the NLRB then asks “whether
the entity was created so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of
the government.”[58] In this case, Chicago Math and Science Academy was
incorporated under the Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 by five
private individuals in 2003. As such, the NLRB found that the first prong of
the Hawkins County test did not apply because Chicago Math and Science
Academy was created by private individuals, not by a government entity, a
legislative act, or a public official.[59] To that end, the NLRB stated:
There is no Illinois statute that directs that charter schools be created or that directly
creates charter schools. Indeed, absent the independent initiative of private individuals
and the separate authority of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Act, the Charter Schools Law
would do nothing to bring charter schools into existence. Rather, the Charter Schools Law
provides that if a charter school is to be created, it must be created by private individuals
who first must establish a private corporation that in turn creates the charter school. And
that is what happened here: private individuals established CMSA first as a nonprofit
corporation, and only then did CMSA establish the Academy. The State of Illinois, by
enacting its Charter Schools Law, has in essence authorized individuals, acting through
private corporations, to establish and operate charter schools, with the Charter Schools
Law acting as the “framework” or “roadmap” by which the schools are operated.[60]

The NLRB also found that Chicago Math and Science Academy was not
“administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the
general electorate” under the second prong of the Hawkins County test. On this
issue, the NLRB asks whether the individuals responsible for administering the
entity are appointed by or subject to removal by public officials.[61] To make this
determination, the NLRB looks to “whether the composition, selection and
removal of the members of an employer’s governing board are determined by law,
or solely by the employer’s governing documents.”[62] Where the majority of the
individuals responsible for administering the entity are subject to appointment
and removal by private individuals, as opposed to public officials, then the NLRB
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will find that the entity is not a political subdivision under the second prong of
the Hawkins County test.
In this case, the NLRB found it dispositive that none of the individuals on the
governing board of Chicago Math and Science Academy were appointed by or
subject to removal by any public official. The process for removing and selecting
board members was set forth in Chicago Math and Science Academy’s bylaws, not
by statute or regulation. The bylaws provided that only sitting board members
could appoint or remove other board members. As the NLRB stated, “no person
affiliated with Chicago Public Schools, the Chicago or State Boards of Education,
the Illinois Department of Education, or any other local or state official has any
involvement in the selection or removal of any members of CMSA’s governing
board.”[63]
The NLRB declined to even consider “additional factors” that it had discussed in
prior cases, such as whether the entity is subject to the state’s Freedom of
Information Act and Open Meetings Act. The NLRB stated that these factors are
relevant only after the NLRB makes its political subdivision determination. The
NLRB stated that the additional factors are relevant only to support or reinforce
the NLRB’s determination,[64] which basically renders the additional factors
meaningless in the analysis.
Still, under Section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA, the NLRB has the discretion to “decline
to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its
jurisdiction.”[65] Thus, the final issue before the NLRB was whether it should,
nevertheless, decline jurisdiction over Chicago Math and Science Academy. The
National Education Association, in an amicus brief,argued that the NLRB should
so decline to assert jurisdiction over Chicago Math and Science Academy under
Section 14(c)(1). The National Education Association argued that the state’s
obligation to provide public schools was a local concern and that its regulation of
charter schools created a “special relationship” between the charter schools and
the state.[66] However, the NLRB rejected this argument, finding that the state
does not assert sufficient control over the charter school’s finances so as to create
a “unique relationship” between the charter schools and the state under NLRB
precedent.[67]
In so holding, the NLRB distinguished a 1972 decision in which it declined to assert
jurisdiction over Temple University due to the “unique relationship” between
Temple and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.[68] In that case, the NLRB
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found that Temple University had been designated as an “instrumentality” of
Pennsylvania and that Pennsylvania exercised substantial control over the
university’s finances.[69] Further, 12 of the 36 board members were appointed by
the governor, the president pro tempore of the senate, and the speaker of the house
of representatives who were each authorized to appoint four of the trustees to
staggered 4-year terms.[70] In declining to assert jurisdiction over Temple
University, the NLRB stated, “[a]lthough the University is in form a private,
nonprofit institution . . . [u]nder the special circumstances of this case, we find that
it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the
University.”[71]
The NLRB distinguished Temple University on the basis that Illinois exercises far
less control over Chicago Math and Science Academy’s finances than Pennsylvania
exercised over Temple University’s finances.[72] Further, the NLRB noted that
neither the State of Illinois nor any other governmental entity appoints any
members to the Chicago Math and Science Academy board of directors.[73]
The NLRB’s holding in Chicago Math and Science Academy answers the question
of whether a charter school should be considered a political subdivision or a private
employer under the NLRA (at least with respect to charter schools established
under Illinois law). Under the Hawkins County test, as applied in this case, a
charter school will not be considered a political subdivision if it is organized as a
private corporation and governed by individuals, a majority of whom, are not
appointed and may not be removed by a public official. As such, unless a state’s
charter school law directly establishes the charter school, or provides a mechanism
for public officials to appoint or remove charter school board members, the charter
school will likely be found to be a private employer subject to the NLRA.
The NLRB’s decision exhibits a cramped view of the structure and organization of
charter schools and ignores the very purpose for creating charter schools in the
first place. Charter schools are formed and operate much like Tennessee utility
districts in Hawkins County. Although the Chicago Math and Science Academy
was organized under the Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act, a charter school
does not need to be a not-for-profit corporation,[74] and being a not-for-profit
corporation does not make it a charter school. Rather, similar to the utility District
in Hawkins County, a charter school must seek a charter from an arm of the
state.[75] Once established, charter schools are funded like public school
districts, [76] and unlike private schools, they cannot exist without such public
funding. [77]
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Additionally, the very nature of charter schools should qualify them as a political
subdivision of the state. As stated by the Illinois General Assembly:
In authorizing charter schools, it is the intent of the General Assembly to create a
legitimate avenue for parents, teachers, and community members to take responsible
risks and create new, innovative, and more flexible ways of educating children within the
public school system. The General Assembly seeks to create opportunities within the
public school system of Illinois for development of innovative and accountable teaching
techniques. The provisions of this Article should be interpreted liberally to support the
findings and goals of this Section and to advance a renewed commitment by the State of
Illinois to the mission, goals, and diversity of public education.[78]

Charter schools are intended to be public schools, open to all,[79] to carry out a
public mission of providing a better education not only for the students they serve
but also for the students of the state’s other public schools that will be able to adopt
the proven educational innovations of the charter schools. The Illinois
Constitution’s mandate that the state “provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services.” [80] empowers the
Legislature to fulfill the mandate by creating entities that are not necessarily
limited to school districts.[81] As such, charter schools are not mere government
contractors.
More importantly, the NLRB’s decision ignores the reasons behind the NLRA’s
exemption for states and their political subdivisions. As the Court stated
in Hawkins County:
The legislative history does reveal, however, that Congress enacted the § 2(2) exemption
to except from Board cognizance the labor relations of federal, state, and municipal
governments, since governmental employees did not usually enjoy the right to strike. In
the light of that purpose, the Board, according to its Brief, p. 11, ‘has limited the exemption
for political subdivisions to entities that are either (1) created directly by the state, so as
to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered
by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.’[82]

The decision to afford charter school employees the protection of the state
collective bargaining laws and grant them the right to strike turns on the purpose
of charter schools to be laboratories of educational innovation, free from the
constraints that bind traditional public schools. This core mission can be frustrated
just as surely by restrictions contained in a collective bargaining agreement or the
collective bargaining process itself, as it can by excessive governmental
regulation.[83]
Education is and has been a primary concern of the states. Accordingly, the NLRB
must give at least some deference to the state’s intent in creating charter schools.
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Although the NLRB acknowledged Illinois’ characterization of charter schools as
being within the public school system as “worthy of careful consideration,”[84] it
is clear that the NLRB gave it no consideration at all. At the very least, in light of
the strict oversight of charter schools provided for in the chartering process, the
NLRB should have exercised its discretion and declined to assert jurisdiction under
section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA.[85]
The NLRB’s attempt to distinguish Temple University amounts to “not seeing the
forest for the trees” because it focuses too much on the amount of control that the
state asserts over the charter school’s finances and whether the state can appoint
members to the school’s board of directors, while ignoring other important
considerations. For example, the NLRB ignored the fact that almost all of the
financing for Illinois charter schools comes from local funding generated by
property tax dollars.[86] The NLRB also gave short shrift to the fact that
educational issues are traditionally within the sovereign powers of the
states.[87] In essence, the NLRB applied a variant of the Hawkins County analysis
to the question of whether it should decline to assert jurisdiction over Chicago
Math and Science Academy under Section 14(c)(1), making the amount of control
the state exerts of the charter school the focus of the analysis. As such, it would
appear that entities that do not qualify as political subdivisions under Hawkins
County also would not enjoy a “unique relationship” with the state under Temple
University. Factors such as the tradition of state control over public education,
whether the charter school is subject to the state’s FOIA and OMA laws, and the
source of the charter school’s funding become irrelevant.
Ultimately, the impact of Chicago Math and Science Academy will depend on
several factors, including, the statutory process other states follow to establish
charter schools, whether the state has a public labor relations law, and if so, how
the state’s public labor relations law compares with the NLRA.
III. CHICAGO MATH AND SCIENCE ACADEMY’S IMPACT
The key question is how the Chicago Math and Science Academy decision will
impact labor relations moving forward.[88] Will the decision make it more
difficult for charter school employees to unionize? Will the decision open up
opportunities to employees who previously had no mechanism for unionization?
Or will the decision have little or no impact? Depending on the state we are
examining, the answer to each of these questions could be “Yes.”
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A.

Other States

The NLRB’s decision in Chicago Math and Science Academy will have the greatest
impact, not on Illinois charter schools, but rather on the charter schools in states
that either do not have a public sector labor law or exempt charter schools from
such laws. Despite those states’ clear intent to not grant collective bargaining rights
to charter school employees, their employees now gain these rights under the
NLRA through the NLRB’s decision. Based upon the NLRB’s reasoning and the
great lengths it took to find that charter schools are not political subdivisions, it is
doubtful that the results will be different in other states. As such, in these states,
charter school employees who previously did not have the ability to organize will
now be able to form unions and bargain collectively under the NLRA.
Of course, there is an easy way out for states that do not want their charter schools
covered by the NLRA. Under Hawkins County, charter schools would be
considered political subdivisions if they are either created directly by the state, or
“administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the
general electorate.”[89] Thus, in Illinois, the Charter Schools Law could be
amended to allow the local school district or state entity which granted the charter
not only the power to revoke the charter, but also the power to remove those who
administer the charter school if the charter school fails to meet the Law’s
requirements. The Charter Schools Law could also be amended to allow citizens
the right to remove charter school board members by referendum. Amending the
Charter Schools Law to allow the state or citizens to remove board members,
however, may be contrary to the general purpose of charter schools, which is to
provide a greater degree of flexibility to experiment with educational
programming. If charter school board members could be removed by the state or
the electorate, fewer individuals may be willing to start a charter school in the first
place or experiment with less traditional educational programming.
B.

Illinois

It would appear that one of the primary reasons Chicago Math and Science
Academy sought to be designated as a private employer by the NLRA was to avoid
the “card check” process under Illinois law. Under the IELRA, “an educational
employer shall voluntarily recognize a labor organization for collective bargaining
purposes if that organization appears to represent a majority of employees in the
unit.”[90] If there is a dispute as to whether the union represents a majority of the
proposed bargaining unit, the dispute is resolved by the IELRB.[91] Elections are
held only if two or more employee organizations seek to represent the same group
of employees.[92] The “card check” process simply requires an employee to sign
an authorization card indicating that he or she authorizes the union to be his or
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her representative. Once a majority of employees have signed the authorization
card, under the IELRA, the employer must recognize the union.
Under the NLRA, however, union representation is generally decided through an
election by secret ballot ordered by the NLRB.[93] Usually, the employer and
union engage in campaigning for weeks prior to the election. During the campaign
process, the employer may distribute information opposing the union and require
employees to attend meetings on the question of union representation where the
employer presents a one-sided argument against the union, also known as “captive
audience speeches.[94] Employers also often hire outside consultants to manage
the campaign and encourage fellow employees to vote against the
union.[95] Union organizers contend that NLRB election “procedures fails to
protect employees’ rights to organize, and forces unions to compete against a
stacked deck that unfairly favors employers.”[96] Indeed, studies have shown that
the level of union support at the beginning of the campaign drops off significantly
by the election.[97] One such study found that “even where 70 percent or more of
employees signed authorization cards asking for a Board-run representation
election, the union won less than two-thirds of those elections.”[98]
Given the hurdles that the NLRB election process places in front of union
organizing efforts when compared with the efficiency of “card check,” it may be
expected that the NLRB’s decision in Chicago Math and Science Academy will
make it significantly more difficult for unions to organize teachers employed at
charter schools in Illinois. However, the impact may be less significant than it
initially appears, at least in states like Illinois that have strong teachers’ unions. As
a practical matter, public school employees, whether teachers or custodians, have
not had a difficult time organizing even before the card check process was adopted.
Employer campaigns have been remarkably unsuccessful. Over ninety percent of
Illinois public school teachers are unionized, and teachers have a long history of
organizing in the state.[99] As a result, despite the apparent collapse of the union
organizing campaign at Chicago Math and Science Academy after the NLRB
decision, there is little reason to believe that the NLRB election process will have a
detrimental impact on the unionization of charter school employees in Illinois and
other states that have a strong teachers union and long history of organizing.[100]
One other possible motivation for management’s desire to be covered by the NLRA
is the belief that the scope of bargaining is narrower under the NLRA than it is
under the IELRA, but that does not appear to be the case. Both acts define the
scope of bargaining similarly, and the Illinois Supreme Court has followed federal
precedent with respect to the scope of bargaining in Illinois.[101]
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In Illinois, these mandatory subjects of bargaining include: class size; individual
student learning plans; teacher planning time; reductions in force; and employee
performance incentives.[102] The mandatory subjects in the educational field are
similar, if not broader under the NLRA. They include such subjects as: faculty
evaluation for the purpose of probation, rank and tenure,[103] and curriculum
development, degree requirements, selection of department and admission
requirements for job responsibilities.[104] As such, the NLRB’s decision, at least
in Illinois, may not have much impact on the scope of bargaining for charter school
employees. However, in states that have a limited scope of bargaining for
educational employees, organizing under the NLRA may give charter school
employees greater opportunity to bargain over their terms and conditions of
employment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Who was the winner?
The winner in this case appears to be the NLRB itself, which now can bootstrap
this decision to assert jurisdiction over virtually all charter schools.
Chicago Math and Science Academy is a clear winner and the Chicago Teachers
Union is a clear loser. After the decision, the union withdrew its representation
petition.
Illinois charter schools and their unions appear to have fought to a draw. The
practical impact of the differences between coverage under the IELRA and the
NLRA on employee relations is fairly minimal. And while charter schools are
spared dealing with unions not strong enough to win representation elections,
unions are also spared the problem of representing employee groups too weak to
win an election.
For unions seeking to organize charter schools in states that do not have public
sector collective bargaining laws, this case is a big win. They can now organize
charter school employees under the NLRA where previously these employees had
no opportunity to organize. Likewise, this case is a win for unions in states where
charter schools are exempted from public sector labor laws. Additionally, this case
may be a victory for charter school employees in states that narrowly define the
scope of bargaining for educational employees under their public sector collective
bargaining laws because the NLRA may provide a broader range of mandatory
bargaining subjects.
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The charter schools in other states are neither winners nor losers. They may now
have to deal with unionization of their workforce and the practical problems of
dealing with unions, but unions are not an insurmountable obstacle to providing a
quality education. Public schools have done so and charter schools will continue
doing so. If anything, this decision will provide an incentive to charter schools to
adopt practices and policies that eliminate the reasons that employees seek the
protections offered by unions.
The biggest losers are the states that have viewed collective barraging as a threat
to their charter schools’ unique status as laboratories for educational change and
innovation. The NLRB has usurped these states’ power to make this decision.
In light of the possible results of the case, the only questions that remain are why
did the parties take the positions they took and why was this case fought at all? For
the Chicago Math and Science Academy and the Chicago Teachers Union the
answer is obvious. Both parties correctly realized that, in this case, the union did
not have the organizational strength to win an election under the NLRA. For
the amici the answer to these questions may not be so simple,” Despite the
national impact of this case, the amici may have focused only on the impact this
decision would have on the Chicago charter schools. Or it may be simply that the
public sector unions (the NEA and AFT) may just feel more comfortable before a
state public labor relations board, and the National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools whose member charter schools, are generally governed by individuals
from the private sector, likely feel more comfortable under the NLRA.
In the end, it may not really matter because under the Hawkins County test, the
states have the power to make charter schools political subdivisions, and thus
exempt from the NLRA, either because they prefer charter schools to be under state
labor laws or exempt for all such laws. All the states need to do is make those who
administer charter schools responsible to the state or the electorate. As such,
parties unhappy with the NLRB’s decision should lobby the General Assembly for
an amendment to the Charter Schools Law. The question, in the end, will be
whether the legislators who must change the law to ensure that the state’s charter
schools are exempt from the NLRA will be willing to tackle the issue at all. In
Illinois, the General Assembly has just recently shown a willingness to confront
charter schools head on.[105] Whether the General Assembly is willing to wade
into this labor relations battle, however, is yet to be seen.
[1] See Motoko Rich, Enrollment in Charter Schools is Increasing, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/us/charter-schools-
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growing-fast-new-report-finds. html?_r=0 (“Between 2010-11 and 2011-12, the
number of students in charter schools increased close to 13 percent, to just over
two million.”).
[2] See Origins of Chartering Timeline, EDUC. EVOLVING, http://www.educatione
volving.org/system/chartering/history-and-origins-of-chartering (last visited
May 6, 2013) (providing a timeline for the evolution of charter schools).
[3] Public employees participate in unions at a rate of approximately 35.9%, while
private sector workers participation rate is only 6.6%. Union Members
Summary, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:00am) http://www.
bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
[4] See, e.g., Illinois Public Act 96-104 (amending the Illinois Charter Schools
Law (105 ILCS 5/27A-1 et seq.) just prior to an Illinois Appellate Court
determination in N. Kane Educ. Corp. v. Cambridge Lakes Educ. Ass’n, IEA-NEA,
394 Ill. App. 3d 755, 759, 914 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (4th Dist. 2009) that charter
schools were not subject to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS
315/1 et seq.)).
[5] James Surowiecki, State of the Unions, THE NEW YORKER, (Jan. 17,
2011), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2011/01/17/110117ta_talk_sur
owiecki (“In 2009, for the first time ever, support for unions in the Gallup poll
dipped below fifty per cent. A 2010 Pew Research poll offered even worse numbers,
with just forty-one per cent of respondents saying they had a favorable view of
unions, the lowest level of support in the history of that poll.”).
[6] Further, how charter schools are treated under the NLRA will impact the
working conditions of thousands of employees employed at charter schools. In
states that do not have public labor relations laws, the NLRA is the only potential
source of collective bargaining rights for employees employed by charter
schools. See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and
Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 885, 931 (2007).
[7] The Treaty of Ghent, which was the peace treaty that ended the War of 1812,
was signed on December 24, 1814. However, due to unusually bad weather over
the Atlantic, news that the war was over did not reach the generals out in the field
before the Battle of New Orleans, which was fought on January 8, 1815. See James
A. Carr, The Battle of New Orleans and the Treaty of Ghent, DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY, July 1979, at 273, 273.
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[8] 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . shall not include . . . any
State or political subdivision thereof.”).
[9] Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41
(Dec. 14, 2012).
[10] 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
[11] Id.
[12] 402 U.S. 600 (1971).
[13] Id. at 604–605.
[14] Id. at 602.
[15] Id. at 601.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 602.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 602-03.
[21] Id. at 602.
[22] Id. at 602-03.
[23] See Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5/2(a) (“Educational
employer” or “employer” means the governing body of a public school district,
including the governing body of a charter school. . . .”).
[24] Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. at 604-05.
[25] Id. at 608.
[26] Id. at 608-9.
[27] See C.I. Wilson Acad., Inc., 28-CA-16809, 2002 WL 1880478 (N.L.R.B. Div.
of Judges July 31, 2002) (finding that charter schools organized under Arizona
Law were not “political subdivisions.”).
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[28] Id.
[29] Charter School Administration Services, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 394 2008).
[30] NLRB Invites Briefs Regarding Charter School Jurisdiction, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/
news-releases/nlrb-invites-briefs-regarding-charter-school-jurisdiction.
[31] 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(a).
[32] Id.
[33] 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(c).
[34] See 105 ILCS 5/27A-11; 27A-11.52.
[35] 105 ILCS 5/27A-4(b).
[36] 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g)(“A charter school is exempt from all other State laws and
regulations in the School Code governing public schools and local school board
policies. . . .”).
[37] N. Kane Educ. Corp. v. Cambridge Lakes Educ. Ass’n, IEA-NEA, 394 Ill. App.
3d 755, 759, 914 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (4th Dist. 2009).
[38] See Illinois Public Act 96-104.
[39] 115 ILCS 5/2.
[40] 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(b).
[41] 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(a).
[42] 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(c).
[43] 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(e).
[44] 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(f).
[45] 105 ILCS 5/27A-6(a).
[46] 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(g)-(h).
[47] 105 ILCS 5/27A-9(c).
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[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] American Federation of Teachers, Teachers at Chicago Math and Science
Academy Form Union, http://www.aft.org/newspubs/news/2010/062410chica
gomsa.cfm (last visited May 1, 2013).
[51] 115 ILCS 5/2.
[52] Rebecca Vevea, Unions Move In at Chicago Charter Schools, and Resistance
Is Swift, NY TIMES (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/us/08
cncharter.html?pagewanted=all.
[53] Id.
[54] Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 NLRB No. 41 at 1.
[55] Id. at 5.
[56] Id. at 4-5.
[57] Id. at 6.
[58] Id.
[59] Id. at 7.
[60] Id.
[61] Id. at 7-8.
[62] Id. at 8.
[63] Id. at 9.
[64] Id. at 9-10.
[65] 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c)(1) (2006).
[66] ChicagoMathematics and Sci Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41 at 10.
[67] Id. at 10-11.
[68] Temple University, 194 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1972).
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[69] Id. at 1160.
[70] Id.
[71] Id. at 2.
[72] Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 NLRB No. 41 at 11.
[73] Id.
[74] 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(a) (“A charter school shall be organized and operated as a
nonprofit corporation or other discrete, legal, nonprofit entity authorized under
the laws of the State of Illinois.”) (emphasis added).
[75] See 105 ILCS 5/27A-7.
[76] 105 ILCS 5/27A-11.
[77] Id.
[78] 105 ILCS 5/27A-2(c).
[79] 105 ILCS 5/27A-4(d) (“Enrollment in a charter school shall be open to any
pupil who resides within the geographic boundaries of the area served by the local
school board. . . .”).
[80] ILCS Const. Art. 10, § 1.
[81] See generally Keime v. Community High School No. 296, 348 Ill. 228, 234,
180 N.E. 858, 860 (1932) (“There is no constitutional restriction or limitation
placed upon the Legislature with reference to the formation of school districts or
the agencies which the Legislature shall adopt to provide the system of free
schools. . . .”) (Emphasis added).
[82] Hawkins Cnty, 402 U.S. at 604-05.
[83] As Governor Wilson of California acknowledges in his veto against a bill that
would have mandated collective bargaining in charter schools, “[Collective
bargaining] will not allow a fair test of [the] experimental approach…The essential
elements of the charter school concept are freedom from state regulation and
employee organizational control, and choice on the part of parents, pupils,
teachers and administrators.” See United Educators of San Francisco v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 25 P.E.R.Cal. ¶32027 (Cal.P.E.R.B. A.L.J. Feb. 16,
2001).
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[84] Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 NLRB No. 41 at 7.
[85] Even though Illinois makes charter schools subject to its collective bargaining
laws, the General Assembly recognized that the unique status of educational
institutions by requiring that they be treated differently from other public
employers. As a result, public educational institutions, including charter schools,
are governed by a separate collective bargaining law, administered by a separate
agency. Compare Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/1et
seq.) with Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq.).
[86] See 105 ICLS 5/27A-11.
[87] See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation
on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign.”) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act because Congress failed to demonstrate a sufficient connection
to interstate commerce).
[88] See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and
Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 885, 931 (2007).
[89] Hawkins Cnty, 402 U.S. at 604-05.
[90] 115 ILCS 5/7(b).
[91] Id.
[92] 115 ILCS 5/7(c).
[93] 29 U.S.C. § 159 ( 2006).
[94] Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Card Check Recognition: New House
Rules for Union Organizing?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 251 (2008).
[95] Id. at 252.
[96] Id. at 247.
[97] Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileging “Employer Free Choice” over
Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REV. 329, 334 (2008).
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[98] Id. at 334-35 (citing Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union
Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption
Underlying the Supreme Court’s Gissel Decision, 79 NW U. LAW REV. 87, 118
(1984)).
[99] Ginger Wheeler, Love/hate relationship: Unions drive school leaders
crazy, ILL. SCH. BD. J. (July/Aug. 2009), available at http://www.iasb.com/jou
rnal/j070809_02.cfm.
[100] However, in states that do not have public sector labor laws, teachers will not
have the long history of unionization and the organizing experience that comes
with it. In these states, the campaign process may have a substantial impact on the
ability of unions to organize teachers at charter schools. Nonetheless, Chicago
Math and Science Academy should be seen as a victory for union supporters in
states that have no public sector labor law, even if it may prove difficult to organize
the teachers since there was no mechanism to organize these employers prior to
the NLRB’s decision.
[101]See Cent. City Educ. Ass’n, IEA/NEA v. IELRB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 515, 599
N.E.2d 892, 901 (Ill. 1992) (“[I]t is also useful to analyze labor relations law in the
private sector, as this is a well-developed field of law that helped to influence the
legislature when it enacted the Act. Private sector labor relations is governed by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Like the Act, the NLRA has a provision
requiring that employers bargain with employees concerning wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment.”).
[102] See, Decatur Bd. of Educ., Dist. No. 61 v. IELRB, 180 III.App.3d 770, 536
N.E.2d 743, 129 III. Dec. 693 (4th Dist. 1993) (class size); Rockford Educ. Ass’n,
IEA-NEA v. Rockford Sch. Dist. No. 205, 22 PERI ¶ 45 (IELRB 2006) (individual
learning plans for underperforming students); Mundelein Elem. Educ. Ass’n v.
Mundelein Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 75, 3 PERI ¶1120 (IELRB 1987) (teacher planning
time); see also Bd. of Educ. Sesser-Valier Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 196 v. IELRB,
250 Ill.App.3d 878, 620 N.E.2d 418, 189 Ill. Dec. 450 (4th Dist. 1993) (district
committed unfair labor practice when it provided individual employees with
specific incentives without bargaining with the employees’ association.)
[103] Puerto Rico Junior Coll., 265 N.L.R.B. 72, 77 (1982).
[104] New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 12 (1973).
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[105] See Illinois Public Act 98-0016. P.A. 98-0016 (effective May 24, 2013),which
places a one-year moratorium on the establishment of virtual charter schools in
the state.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:

Marco Berrios, Kelly Carson, Alec Hausermann, and Stephanie Ridella
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes and the equal employment
opportunity laws.
I.

IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Subcontracting

In AFSCME, Council 31 v. McLean County Unit Dist. 5, Case No. 2012-CA-0043S (IELRB 2013), the IELRB affirmed the rulings of the ALJ finding that McLean
County Unit Dist. 5 (McLean) had violated sections 14(a)(1), 14(a)(3), and 14(a)(5)
of the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act “by entering into a contract for
transportation services with a [private company] and discharging [American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31’s
(“AFSCME”)] members in retaliation for their union activity” and “by unilaterally
entering into a contract to subcontract all of its transportation services.” The
14(a)(3) charge alleged that McLean subcontracted the employees’ jobs in
retaliation for their having selected AFSCME as their exclusive bargaining
representative. The IELRB stated that all elements of the prima facie case for a
section 14(a)(3) violation had been met, based on the timing of McLean’s choice to
subcontract in relation to AFSCME being elected the exclusive bargaining
representative. Essentially, McLean caused the bargaining unit, that had just
elected AFSCME, to cease to exist by subcontracting the jobs of the members of the
bargaining unit. It was determined that this created a significant hindrance upon
the employees’ right to organize.
The establishment of the prima facie case normally would shift the burden to the
employer to show a legitimate business reason for its actions, but the Board agreed
with the ALJ in finding that in cases where the retaliatory action is inherently
destructive of employees’ statutory rights, even a legitimate business reason may
not remove the inference that McLean intended to discourage employees from
exercising their statutory rights.
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The IELRB also agreed with the ALJ’s findings of a section 14(a)(5), refusal to
bargain, violation. The IELRB found that the ALJ correctly applied the standards
that it is a violation to unilaterally change the status quo of a mandatory subject of
bargaining without providing the exclusive representative with notice and the
ability to bargain or not bargaining to an impasse with that exclusive bargaining
representative.
McLean’s also excepted to the ALJ’s remedy, which ordered McLean to rescind its
agreement with the private transportation company, reinstate terminated
bargaining unit members, make whole any bargaining unit members that were
effected, and bargain with AFSCME in good faith. McLean argued that having to
rescind its contract with the private transportation company would be unduly
burdensome, but the IELRB did not agree, pointing out that rescission of the
agreement is the standard remedy in such instances in such circumstances.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Duty to Bargain

In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700 and Lake County Circuit
Clerk, 29 PERI ¶ 179 (ILRB State Panel 2013), the State Panel reversed the
recommendation of the administrative law judge and found that the County
bargained in good faith over a fair share clause in the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). The Union claimed that the County engaged in surface
bargaining in violation of sections 10(a)(4) and 10(a)(1) of the IPLRA while
negotiating an initial CBA. The basis for the Union’s claim was the County’s refusal
to agree to a fair share clause in the CBA. The parties were able to tentatively agree
to a number of items after the Union’s first proposal, but the County omitted the
fair share clause in its proposal.
In the course of nine months, the parties reached tentative agreement on a number
of issues, but the County refused to make concessions on the fair share clause. The
Union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging, among other charges, that the
County engaged in surface bargaining. Negotiations continued for six months
after the charge was filed, but the County continued to reject modified proposals
regarding the fair share clause.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the ALJ did not accept the County’s
position that it had engaged in hard bargaining but in not surface bargaining
. Because the County refused to consider a fair share clause at all, the ALJ found
that it did not have the required intent to reach an agreement. The County argued
that under Section 7 of the IPLRA it was not obliged to agree to a proposal or make
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concessions. The County pointed to the many other issues agreed upon over the
course of numerous bargaining sessions, and said that it had considered the
proposed fair share clause, but rejected it because it would impose economic
hardship upon its employees and not be in all of the employees’ best interests.
The State Panel, dismissing the charge, reiterated the principle that the Panel is
not empowered to force a party to make a concession on any particular issue,
despite the obligation to bargain in good faith with the intent to reach an
agreement. The Panel agreed that the ALJ had articulated the correct standard,
looking at the totality of the circumstances, but that the ALJ’s conclusion was
based solely on the refusal to negotiate a fair share clause, and ignored the fact that
the parties engaged in meaningful negotiations over many issues, reaching a
number of tentative agreements. Besides the County’s alleged unreasonableness
over fair share, no other evidence of bad faith could be found in the record.
The Panel conceded that the subject of fair share is significant, and exactly the type
of issue an employer might exploit to avoid agreement, clothed in the guise of hard
bargaining. For that reason, the Panel stated that an employer’s intransigence on
such an issue should “draw particular scrutiny.” However, in the absence of other
evidence of bad faith, the Panel refused to find surface bargaining solely because
the County refused to make a concession on this one issue. While the County’s
position on fair share might be pretextual, the Panel would not find the County’s
refusal to consider fair share per se unreasonable absent other evidence of bad
faith. To find surface bargaining based solely on a refusal to negotiate this one
issue would be “tantamount to creating a per se rule requiring employers to make
concessions on fair share proposals,” would be contrary to legislative intent and
Board precedent. Because the parties were negotiating an initial agreement, the
Panel distinguished the instant case from cases where a party’s position was
inconsistent with the position taken in other negotiations.
B.

Supervisors

In Service Employees International Union, Local 73 v. ILRB, Local Panel, and
City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120279, the Fist District Appellate Court
affirmed a decision by the Illinois Labor Relations Board, Local Panel, denying the
representation-certification petition brought by the Union to represent
supervising investigators employed by the City of Chicago’s Independent Police
Review Authority (IPRA). The Paenl had reversed an administrative law judge’s
conclusion that the supervising investigators were supervisors within the meaning
of section 3(r) of the IPLRA.
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The ALJ found testimony by the IPRA’s chief administrator, Ilana Rosenzweig, was
reliable and credible and concluded that the supervising investigators’ work was
different form the work of the investigators because: (1) supervising investigators
retain and exercise discretion in the reporting of misconduct and recommendation
of discipline; and (2) supervising investigators have the authority to process
grievances and reward subordinate employees for their performance. However,
the ALJ ordered that the Union be certified as the exclusive representatives of the
supervising investigators because the (1) supervising investigators were not
engaged in supervisory functions a preponderance of the time, and the (2)
supervising investigators did not have managerial status under the Act, as they did
not implement sufficiently broad policy determinations.
The Local Panel disagreed with the ALJ’s recommendation and dismissed the
Union’s petition, finding that the supervising investigators spent most of their time
reviewing reports and giving instructions that went unchallenged in the vast
majority of cases. The Board, therefore, disagreed with the ALJ’s finding that the
supervising investigators do not “direct” employees within the meaning of the Act;
the Board found that the supervising investigators spent a preponderance of the
time performing supervisory tasks.
Section 3(r) of the IPLRA defines “Supervisor” as:
[A]n employee whose principal work is substantially different than that of his or her
subordinates and who has authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, to
adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend any of those actions, if the exercise
of the that authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
consistent use of independent judgment. Except with respect to police employment, the
term “supervisor” includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their
employment time to exercising that authority.

The critical issue on appeal was whether the supervising investigators “directed”
employees within the meaning of the Act, given the reasoning of the Board’s
decision and Rosenzweig’s testimony that supervising investigators spent 95.5
percent of their time assigning and supervising cases. According to the court, one
indicium of supervisory authority accompanied by independent judgment is
sufficient to indicate supervisory status. The court observed that an analysis of
whether supervising investigators were supervisory under the Act required a
consideration not only of whether they “direct” their employees, but also whether
they exercise significant discretionary authority that affects wages, discipline and
other working conditions.
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The Union likened supervising investigators’ case reviews to “mere proofreading”
or quality control on an assembly line; the Union also compared case review to the
direction which lieutenants give to firefighters at a fire scene, which is derived from
their superior skill and technical expertise, and does not require the use of
independent judgment in the interest of the employer as required by the Act. The
court, however, relied on Rosenzweig’s testimony which demonstrated that
supervising investigators gave their subordinate investigators feedback and
written notes during investigations, and that they ensured that their subordinates
obtained supplemental police reports, forensic test results and other type of
supplemental information. The court acknowledged that the Board did not focus
on the nature of these activities, but concluded that the record indicated that the
work involved more than proof reading or mere quality control. Assigning and
monitoring the investigators’ work was the most important and predominant tasks
performed by supervising investigators. According to the court, case law
established that these tasks are considered “direction” under the Act.
The Union argued that supervising investigators did not have the authority to
reward subordinates because superiors, and not supervising investigators, make
suggestions regarding employees’ evaluations. But the court quickly side stepped
that argument stating that the mere fact that a superior is involved in the decision
making process does not exclude the supervising investigator from supervisory
status under the Act. Rosenzweig testified that she never rejected a supervising
investigator’s evaluation, which led the court to conclude that supervising
investigators’ evaluations were at least effective recommendations where
performance evaluations were, in turn, used when considering promotions under
the collection bargaining agreement.
The Union also argued that the supervising investigators had no authority to
discipline subordinates because they not consistently exercise discretion regarding
discipline and the discretion to report misconduct did not rise to the level of
supervisory authority. However, the court found the record indicated otherwise,
where Rosenzweig identified a variety of notices of progressive discipline imposed
by supervising investigators. The court also mentioned that just because one
supervising investigator had never issued an oral or written reprimand did not
mean that she lacked that authority to do so.
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Retaliation

In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct 2517
(2013), the Supreme Court held that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved
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according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the motivating-factor
standard for other Title VII discrimination claims (what the Court called “statusbased discrimination” – discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin). For status-based discrimination claims, the Civil Rights Act of
1991 codified a lesser causation standard, where “[i]t suffices instead to show that
the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer
also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”
The Court looked to its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S.
167 (2009), where it decided that the ADEA requires proof that the prohibited
criterion was the but-for cause of the prohibited conduct, to determine the
causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims. In Gross, the Court refused to
apply the motivating-factor standard to age based discrimination claims,
emphasizing that Congress failed to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII
in 1991, despite the two statutes’ similar wording.
The Court reasoned that the 1991 Civil Rights Act language incorporating the
motivating-factor standard addressed only status-based discrimination, not
retaliation. Additionally, the structure of the statute was instructive. Congress
inserted the motivating-factor provision as a subsection of the ban on status-based
discrimination. The Court presumed that Congress’s choices of words and
structure indicated that it did not intend to address retaliation claims.
The Court emphasized the importance of correctly interpreting the causation
standard because of the need to efficiently allocate judicial resources, especially in
light of the increasing frequency of retaliation claims. Lessening the causation
standard would increase frivolous claims, and “[i]t would be inconsistent with the
structure and operation of Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and
reputational, on an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any
discriminatory or retaliatory intent.”
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, lamented the Court’s decision, which “drives a wedge
between the twin safeguards [of discrimination and retaliation claims] in so-called
‘mixed motive’ cases.” “In so reining in retaliation claims, the Court
misapprehends what our decisions teach: Retaliation for complaining about
discrimination is tightly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be
disassociated from it.” The Court’s decision, making retaliation a discrete category
from status-based discrimination, “runs up against precedent,” and diverges from
what the Court has previously viewed retaliation as – “a manifestation of statusbased discrimination.”
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Given that Congress’s stated purpose in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to
“restore and strengthen . . . laws that ban discrimination in employment,” the
dissent could not fathom that Congress meant to exclude retaliation claims from
the motivating-factor standard. Furthermore, from its codification, the EEOC
Guidance has interpreted the amendment to include retaliation, and the agency
guidelines should be accorded respect.
The dissent also criticized the Court’s decision as risking confusing juries by
requiring separate standards for discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, the
dissent considered “a strict but-for test is particularly ill suited to employment
discrimination cases,” as assessing multiple motives requires guessing what would
have happened if an employer’s thoughts were different.
B.

Sexual Harassment

In Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S.Ct. 2734 (2013), the Court decided who
qualifies as a supervisor under the standard articulated in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775
(1998) governing employer liability for sexual harassment. The Court held “that
an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he
or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against
the victim,” adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definition. The Court rejected the
EEOC’s Guidance, and defined tangible employment action as the power “to effect
a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.”
The Court acknowledged the varying colloquial and legal definitions of
“supervisor,” and turned to the “highly-structured” Ellerth/Faragher framework
to define the term. The Court said that the “authority to take tangible employment
actions is the defining characteristic of a supervisor, not simply a characteristic of
a subset of an ill-defined class of employees who qualify as supervisors.” The Court
emphasized that the Seventh Circuit’s standard is workable, avoids confusing
juries, and is more efficient, because often supervisor status would be determined
as a matter of law before trial. Parties would be able to focus on other issues at bar,
and jury instructions would be simplified.
The Court said that employees will not be left unprotected from co-worker
harassment, because the Ellerth/Faragher framework holds employers liable
when they negligently fail to stop harassment. While a test assessing the varying
degrees of authority an employee has over other employees is too unwieldy and
inefficient when determining supervisor status to establish an employer’s vicarious
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liability, under a negligence standard juries should be instructed that the nature
and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, would have adopted the EEOC Guidance, which asks:
“Has the employer given the alleged harasser authority to take tangible
employment actions or to control the conditions under which subordinates do
their daily work?” The dissent said that the decision of the Court diminishes the
force of Ellerth/Faragher, ignores the realities of the modern workplace, and
disserves the objective of Title VII. The Court’s lauding of “simplicity and
administrability” serves to weaken workplace protections against harassment.

